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ABSTRACT In this article, I reconsider bio-essentialism in the study of kinship, centering on David Schneider’s
influential critique that concluded that kinship was “a non-subject” (1972:51). Schneider’s critique is often taken to
have shown the limitations of and problemswith past views of kinship based on biology, genealogy, and reproduction,
a critique that subsequently led those reworking kinship as relatedness in the new kinship studies to view their
enterprise as divorced from such bio-essentialist studies. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting kinship
past and present and concluding by introducing a novel way of thinking about kinship, I have three constituent
aims in this research article: (1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past and kinship present; (2) to
reevaluate Schneider’s critique of bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary study of kinship; and
(3) subsequently to redirect theoretical discussion of what kinship is. This concluding discussion introduces a general
view, the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds, into anthropology, providing a theoretical framework that
facilitates realization of the often-touted desideratum of the integration of biological and social features of kinship.
[bio-essentialism, kinship studies, homeostatic property cluster kinds, Schneider, genealogy]
ABSTRAIT Cet article reconside`re le bio-essentialisme dans l’e´tude de la parente´, en mettant l’accent sur la cri-
tique influente de David Schneider soutenant que la parente´ est un «non-sujet» (1972:51). La critique de Schneider
est souvent conside´re´e comme ayant de´montre´ les limites des conceptions de la parente´ fonde´es sur la biologie,
la ge´ne´alogie et la reproduction. Dans les nouvelles e´tudes de la parente´, cette critique a conduit ceux qui travail-
lent sur la parente´ conc¸ue comme apparentement a` pre´senter leur entreprise comme e´tant oppose´e aux e´tudes
bio-essentialistes. Commenc¸ant avec un re´cit reliant parente´ passe´e et pre´sente et offrant une nouvelle fac¸on de
penser la parente´, cet article a trois objectifs cardinaux: (1) rede´finir la relation entre la parente´ passe´e et la parente´
pre´sente, (2) re´e´valuer la critique par Schneider du bio-essentialisme et ce qu’il implique pour l’e´tude contempo-
raine de la parente´, et (3) enfin re´orienter la discussion the´orique de ce qu’est la parente´. Cette discussion se
termine par l’introduction en anthropologie d’un sche`me conceptuel – le groupement de proprie´te´s home´ostatiques
(GPH) vue de cate´gories naturelles – fournissant un cadre the´orique pour l’inte´gration tant recherche´e des car-
acte´ristique biologiques et sociales de la parente´. [bio-essentialisme. e´tudes de la parente´, le groupement de pro-
prie´te´s home´ostatiques (GPH), Schneider, ge´ne´alogie]
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG In diesem Beitrag vertrete ich den biologischen Essentialismus (Bio-essentialismus) in
Verwandtschaftsstudien. Im Vordergrund steht David Schneiders einflussreiche Kritik, die darauf hinausla¨uft, dass
Verwandtschaft kein Gegenstand sei. Zumeist wird davon ausgegangen, dass Schneiders Kritik die Grenzen und
Probleme vergangener, auf Biologie, Genealogie und Reproduktion basierender Auffassungen von Verwandtschaft
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aufzeigt hat, was spa¨ter dazu gefu¨hrt hat, dass jene, die Verwandtschaft als ,,relatedness“definierten, ihr Projekt
als vom Bio-essentialismus streng getrennt betrachteten. Ausgehend von einem alternativen Narrativ, dass vergan-
gene und gegenwa¨rtige Verwandschaftskonzepte verbindet, sowie durch die Einfu¨hrung einer neuen Versta¨ndnisses
von Verwandtschaft, habe ich in diesem Beitrag drei zentrale Ziele erreichen: (1) Die Beziehung zwischen ver-
gangenen und gegenwa¨rtigen Verwandschaftskonzepten u¨berdenken, (2) Schneiders Kritik und ihre Implikationen
fu¨r gegenwa¨rtige Verwandtschaftsstudien reevaluieren, und (3) die theoretische Diskussion daru¨ber, was Ver-
wandtschaft ist, neu ausrichten. Der Beitrag schließt damit, ein allgemeines Konzept – den ,,homeostatic property
cluster view of kinds“ (HPC) – in die anthropologische Diskussion einzubringen, als einen theoretischen Rahmen, der
die Verwirklichung des oft beschworenen Desideratums der Integration der biologischen und sozialen Eigenschaften
von Verwandtschaft erleichtert. [Bio-essentialismus, Verwandtschaftsstudien, den “homeostatic property cluster
view of kinds” (HPC), Schneider, Genealogie”]
RESUMEN Este artı´culo reconsidera el esencialismo biolo´gico (bio-esencialismo) en el estudio del parentesco,
centra´ndose en la influyente crı´tica de David Schneider. A menudo se considera que la crı´tica de Schneider ha de-
mostrado los problemas y las limitaciones de teorı´as del parentesco anteriores, basadas en la biologı´a, la genealogı´a
y la reproduccio´n. Su crı´tica contribuyo´ a que aquellos que trabajaban el parentesco como afinidad (“related-
ness”) en el marco de los nuevos estudios del parentesco vieran su proyecto como desconectado de los enfoques
bio-esencialistas anteriores. Mediante una narrativa alternativa que conecta el parentesco pasado y presente, y
concluyendo con una manera innovadora de pensar el parentesco, el presente artı´culo esta´ constituido con tres
objetivos en mente: (1) re-conceptualizar la relacio´n entre parentesco pasado y presente, (2) reevaluar la crı´tica al
bio-esencialismo de Schneider y lo que ello conlleva para los estudios contempora´neos del parentesco, y (3) ulterior-
mente redirigir la discusio´n teo´rica sobre que´ es el parentesco. En esta seccio´n final se introduce en la antropologı´a
una visio´n general, la teorı´a del cluster de propiedades homeosta´tico (HPC) de tipos (kinds). Este marco teo´rico
facilita la realizacio´n del desidera´tum de la integracio´n de los aspectos biolo´gicos y sociales del parentesco. [bio-
esencialismo, estudio del parentesco, cluster de propiedades homeosta´tico (HPC) de tipos, Schneider, genealogı´a]
Kinship is like totemism, matriarchy, and the “matrilineal com-
plex.” It is a non-subject. It exists in the minds of anthropologists
but not in the cultures they study.
–David Schneider, “What Is Kinship All About?” [1972:51]
INTRODUCTION
Consider a familiar narrative about kinship and its anthro-
pological study. Once regarded within anthropology as a
key to understanding the functioning and evolution of hu-
man culture and “perhaps the one field in which social and
cultural anthropology could claim to have booked secure ad-
vances” (Kuper 1999:131), kinship was foundational for the
ethnographic study of social structures and cultural practices
throughout much of the 20th century. Despite this, the sta-
tus of kinship studies fell precipitously from grace during the
1970s. Conceptualized as distinctively biological, genealog-
ical, or reproductive (or bio-essentialist), kinship and its study
came to be seen as having “reinforced the boundaries be-
tween the West and the rest” (Carsten 2004:15). Strangely
manifesting its own kind of ethnocentrism, the study of
kinship became an uncomfortable reminder of a colonial
impulse that had motivated another, already jettisoned part
of cultural anthropology’s past: the study of primitive society
(Kuper 2005).
Yet rather than disappearing from anthropology, as had
the study of primitive society, kinship was transformed. In
kinship past, distinctively Western, bio-essentialist concep-
tions of kinship dominated ethnographic studies of kinship;
in kinship present, such conceptions had been replaced by
the more encompassing notion of “relatedness” in the “new
kinship studies” (Carsten 2000; Peletz 2001). Given the
various negative associations that bio-essentialist views had
accumulated within cultural anthropology more generally,
a rearticulation of kinship free of past bio-essentialism was a
welcome advance.1
David Schneider’s extended critique of kinship (1965a,
1965b, 1970, 1972, 1977[1969], 1980[1968], 1984) is
widely recognized as having played an influential role not
only in the demise of bio-essentialist kinship studies but
also in this subsequent reworking of kinship. For exam-
ple, Nancy Levine (2008:376) identified Schneider’s cri-
tique as both “the most devastating and most productive
for future research,” a judgment shared by many other
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contemporary kinship theorists who self-consciously dis-
tanced their work from traditional kinship studies, doing
so by explicitly acknowledging Schneider’s critique of bio-
essentialism (Carsten 2004:18–24; Franklin and McKinnon
2001a:2–3; Strathern 1992:xviii, 4; Yanagisako and Collier
1987:29–32).2
Schneider’s central place in establishing a viewof kinship
past as bio-essentialist is also reflected in contemporarywork
less comfortably viewed as part of the new kinship studies.
Marshall Sahlins’s (2011a:6–10; 2013a:12–18) sweeping,
recent writing on kinship, critical as it is of core aspects
of Schneider’s critique, shows Schneider’s influence in its
sustained attack on the very aspects of kinship studies that
were Schneider’s primary target: its bio-essentialism (Sahlins
2013a:62–89). The influence of Schneider’s critique is also
singled out in recent articles in this journal—on adoption
and child circulation in the Marshall Islands (Berman 2014)
and on fatherhood and paternal investment in the Mosuo
(Mattison et al. 2014)—that more tentatively return to ex-
plore of the role of biological relationships in kinship.3
My central aim in this article is to reconsider bio-
essentialism in the study of kinship, focusing on Schneider’s
critique. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting
kinship past and present and concluding by introducing a
novel way of thinking of kinship that draws on resources
beyond anthropology, I here have three constituent aims:
(1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past
and kinship present; (2) to reevaluate Schneider’s critique of
bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary
study of kinship; and (3) subsequently to redirect theo-
retical discussion of what kinship is by applying a view, the
so-called homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds,
to kinship. This view provides a theoretical framework that
facilitates the realization of the often-touted desideratum of
the integration of biological and social features of kinship
and does so whether or not the view itself constitutes a form
of bio-essentialism.4
BEYOND THE STANDARD NARRATIVE: THE 1960S
AND ALL THAT
The revival of kinship in a post-Schneiderian guise opened
up a novel array of topics—reproductive technologies, cho-
sen families, autoethnography, gay and lesbian intimacy, in-
vented communities, the body andpersonhood, artificial life,
Internet dating, identity politics, disability activism, ethnic-
ity, and adoption practices—and innovative approaches for
those working on the various meanings that relatedness has
for individuals and cultures. Methodologically, rather than
focusing on structural or functional aspects of culturally ex-
otic forms of kinship, such studies typically emphasize the
performativity and lived experience of kinship, exploring
how ongoing bodily and mindful interaction with techno-
logical and other social innovations shifts the meaning that
kinship has in domestic and distinctly Western sites, such as
in vitro fertilization clinics.5
As indicated, the dominant contemporary narrative
within cultural anthropology about kinship is anchored
around Schneider’s charge of bio-essentialism against the
past study of kinship. When Alfred Kroeber (1909) posited
procreation as a process that unifies all kinship systems,
when Kingsley Davis and Lloyd Warner (1937:292) said
that “kinship may be defined as social relationships based on
connection through birth,” or when E. E. Evans-Pritchard
(1940:183) spoke of being a kinsman “actually or by fiction,”
they manifested this kind of bio-essentialism, one that privi-
leged biological relations over other relations in the concep-
tualization of kinship. In effect, Schneider (1984) argued that
kinship theory in general was methodologically structured
around a kind of translation manual that all ethnographic
investigations of kinship should consult in understanding
kinship systems other than their own. That manual directed
theorists to translate all putative kinship terminologies via
a biological–genealogical–reproductive grid and, thus, to
conceptualize kinship bio-essentially in any ethnographic
context. For Schneider, that bio-essentialist grid was an
ethnocentric projection, imposing a peculiarly American-
European conception of kinship onto other cultures.6
According to this narrative, Schneider’s critique of
kinship showed that past disciplinary obsession with the
reductive project of shaking each culture through the
bio-essentialist sieve of kinship was fatally flawed. Next,
following a short, dumbfounded lull in work on kinship
(especially in North America), a concept of kinship liber-
ated from bio-essentialist presuppositions arose, resulting in
work often expressed not in the language of kin and kinship
but in that of relatives and relatedness. In shedding the skin
of bio-essentialism, the new kinship studies made a deci-
sive break with a more troubled anthropological past that
was scientistic and ethnocentric (Carsten 2004; Franklin and
McKinnon 2001a; Moutu 2013; Weston 1997; Yanagisako
and Delaney 1995).
This general type of narrative is familiar to historians,
philosophers, and sociologists of science, being a variation on
the radical juncture approaches of the two most influential
figures in the intersection of these fields, Thomas Kuhn
(1962) and Michel Foucault (2002[1969]). We could thus
read this standard narrative either in terms of there being
a Kuhnian paradigm shift mediated by Schneider’s critique
and its uptake by the new kinship studies or as exemplifying
a new Foucauldian discursive formation or episteme for the
study of relatives that breaks free of the bio-essentialism of
the past through a Schneiderian radical juncture (cf. Carsten
2004:19).
Although it is common to offer some sort of critique
of a dominant narrative before (or as a part of) motivating
an alternative to it, here I want simply to provide a short
statement of such an alternative narrative, one that aims to
facilitate a rethinking of the story that many anthropolo-
gists now tell themselves about the place of bio-essentialism
in kinship past and present. In fact, there has been no
radical juncture in the study of kinship; calls to rethink
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kinship have recurred with sufficient regularity throughout
the 20th century to constitute something of a disciplinary
ritual of their own. Since the disciplinary-founding work of
those legalistic, proto-anthropologists Henry Maine, John
Ferguson McLennan, and Lewis Henry Morgan, kinship sys-
tems have been viewed as culturally universal, with the
variety in kinship systems being at least an order of mag-
nitude smaller than the number of cultures. Hypotheses
about the genealogical, structural, and functional affinities
between the various kinship systems have been at the heart
of kinship theory, with theorists concerned about the so-
cial significance of certain, putative biological facts, such
as the supposed necessity of biparental sex for reproduc-
tion, mothers for birth, and the dependence of infants on
parental, especially maternal, care. Such “facts” were some-
times viewed as biological universals about, or determinants
of, kinship. Schneider’s critique of kinship targeted such
bio-essentialism.
Like much social science, the study of kinship draws on
and adapts existing folk concepts. But the idea of Western
bio-essentialized folk concepts of kinship being endlessly
ethnocentrically projected onto non-Western cultures by
ethnographers and kinship theorists is itself a kind of an-
thropological myth. Liberating kinship from its putatively
bio-essentialized shackles has rarely led in practice to aban-
donment of the biological facts that anchor kinship termi-
nologies and concepts across all cultures. This is true both of
the extension of kinship studies into domestic spaces and of
continuing attempts to articulate the practice and lived re-
ality of kinship in non-Western cultures (see Berman 2014;
Mattison et al. 2014). The study of kinship has changed in-
novatively due to Schneider’s influence. Yet it is a projection
of its own kind to view these changes as marking a radical
juncture in that study.
Whatever doubts there are about the extent of ethno-
centric projection in understanding kinship studies past, we
can nonetheless maintain the idea that a conception of kin-
ship indeed has been projected from “theWest” to “the Rest”
in kinship present (cf. Kuper 2008, esp. pp. 727–728). This
conception of kinship reflects the shift in kinship structures
in the West in the 1960s and 1970s, a shift that involved
experimentation with different ways of being a mother, a
father, a child, and a family. That was, as they say, the 1960s:
working mothers, the spread of contraception, skyrocketing
divorce rates, Brady Bunch families, communal living and
free love, sexual liberation, dropping out. Combined with
developing technologies of reproduction, those in the West
had new ways to live and new ways to make new sorts of
people to live in those newways. AsWestern conceptions of
kinship were pried from whatever forms of bio-essentialism
rigidified them, anthropologists subsequently came to speak
more freely of relatives than of kin, of relationships rather
than of kinship. Relative and relatedness came to be the pre-
ferred terms of cultural analysis for emerging forms of kin-
ship. That conception of kinship was then projected onto
societies subject to past colonial and imperial influence,
including through ethnographic intervention and its after-
math: kinship theory.
In short, if there has been an ethnocentric projection
from the West to the Rest regarding kinship, it is more re-
cent than proponents of the standard narrative of the history
of kinship studies have thought. It is the projection of an
extended or loosened concept of relatedness to places that
anthropologists then find it to have existed in all along, a
projection that reflects the social changes in Western soci-
eties underway since anthropology has been engaged in the
very project of rethinking kinship.
RELOCATING SCHNEIDER
Schneider’s critique extended over a 20-year period, cul-
minating in his A Critique of the Study of Kinship (1984). It
was influential in part because it dovetailed with broader
theoretical and political changes to the discipline during the
1970s, such as the emergence of feminist perspectives on
gender, the family, and social structure (Ortner 1984) and
the shift away from structural approaches to society in favor
of interpretative understandings of culture (Geertz 1973).
In these respects, Schneider’s critique contrasted with that
of another leading internal critic of kinship studies, Rodney
Needham.
In much the way that Schneider would shortly sum-
marize his own views, Needham (1971:5) had claimed that
“there is no such thing as kinship, and it follows that there
can be no such thing as kinship theory.” Prior to reaching this
conclusion, Needham had previously engaged in philosoph-
ical debate focused on the distinction between “physical”
and “social” kinship that was so important in British social
anthropology (Barnes 1961; Beattie 1964; Gellner 1957,
1960, 1963; Needham 1960). But three other features of
Needham’s view are more important here in relocating
Schneider’s critique of bio-essentialism.
First, Needham’s reasons for this concordant conclu-
sion were explicitly Wittgensteinian, appealing to Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s cautionary reminders about the misplaced
search for essences and criterial meaning and drawing on
his famous analogies to games and family resemblances in
thinking beyond essentialism.7 Second, Needham made no
attempt to link his views here to external developments else-
where in anthropology or academia more generally, despite
his earlier interdisciplinary engagements regarding physical
and social kinship (e.g., Gellner 1960). Third, this repudia-
tion of kinship and kinship theory was not accompanied by
methodological or practical changes in how one regarded
either kinship or kinship theory.
Despite sharing a conclusion with Needham,
Schneider’s challenge differed in all three of these respects. It
was grounded not in thework of a philosopherwithmarginal
standing among anthropologists but in the idea that cultural
investigations should focus on the symbols that make up a
culture and how they are understood within it. Schneider
(1980[1968]:18) made explicit his focus on “the symbols
which are American kinship,” foregrounding his emphasis
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both on meaning and on kinship in the West. Schneider’s
symbolic anthropology was distinguished from the related
hermeneutical, interpretative approach (e.g., Geertz 1973)
by Schneider’s methodological view of anthropology as an
empirical, inductive enterprise and by his divorce of culture
from consideration of norms and values (e.g., Schneider
1976:202–203). These meaning-centered approaches, both
deriving originally from the heuristic separation of culture
as the realm for anthropology advocated by Talcott Parsons
(1951), spoke to, and indeed stoked, deep-seated, longer-
standing relativist tendencies within anthropology; both also
found affinities with broader poststructuralist trends in the
humanities and social sciences that swept through North
American universities in the 1970s.
The third point of contrast between Needham and
Schneider, however, is most significant here. As one of
his titles—American Kinship—suggests, Schneider shifted his
focus in kinship studies from culturally exotic to cultur-
ally familiar locations. In the late 1940s, Schneider had
undertaken ethnographic work on the Micronesian island
of Yap, much of which concentrated on kinship (Schnei-
der 1953, 1962; see also Schneider with Handler 1995).
Schneider’s work on kinship in the United States had begun
jointly with the sociologist George Homans (Homans and
Schneider 1955; Schneider and Homans 1955), work from
which Schneider later distanced himself (Schneider 1965a;
see also Feinberg 2001:7). In American Kinship (1980[1968]),
Schneider’s emerging critical view of kinship studies meshed
with the symbolic view of culture and cultural anthropol-
ogy that he saw replacing such ethnographic and sociological
studies. Schneider’s interest in kinship as a cultural system
and in offering descriptions that captured the participant per-
spective led him to viewU.S. kinship as a system ofmeanings
structured around the twin symbols of blood (shared bio-
genetic substance) and love (“diffuse, enduring solidarity”).
For Schneider, these symbols provided the key to under-
standing kinship in U.S. culture, contrasting this with a view
of kinship simply as a result of biological facts.8
UNDERSTANDING BIO-ESSENTIALISM
IN SCHNEIDER
Although Schneider’s critique of kinship studies was appar-
ent in his work from 1965 to 1975, his most sustained
criticisms are contained in A Critique of the Study of Kinship
(1984), the concluding chapters of which provide capsule
statements of two related clusters of criticisms. The first
critiques the “quartet of kinship, economics, politics, and
religion” (1984:184) as nothing more than “a valiant at-
tempt to use the constructions of European culture as tools
for description, comparison, and analysis” (1984:185). The
second cluster of criticisms offers a version of this claim about
kinship in particular: in undertaking elaborate ethnographic
reconstructions of other cultures in terms of a specific, Euro-
centric conception of kinship that is bio-essentialist, kinship
theorists have committed the near-original anthropological
sin of ethnocentric projection.
Given the place of what I am calling “bio-essentialism”
in Schneider’s extensive critique and the subsequent uptake
of that critique in the new kinship studies, it is surprisingly
difficult to find a precise expression of what the charge of
bio-essentialism amounts to in Schneider’s work. We need
to undertake at least a little hermeneutical elbow work of
our own to understand just what about kinship, according
to Schneider, has been ethnocentrically projected.
Schneider summarizes his views at length in his fi-
nal chapter of A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Here he
identifies “three basic axioms used in the study of kinship”
(1984:188), all of which he thinks are mistaken, Eurocen-
tric projections. Together they support a view that Schneider
also thinks is false called the “Doctrine of the Genealogical
Unity of Mankind”—“the thesis that at one level all genealo-
gies are equal to each other, or can be treated as dealing
with the same thing and so are comparable” (1984:125).
While there is a sense in which, for Schneider, this doctrine,
assumed in both Parson’s (1951) and George Murdock’s
(1949) foundationalist views of biology in the study of cul-
ture, is at the heart of kinship studies, because according to
Schneider himself it is derived from three “axioms,” it is
not the most fundamental thesis that Schneider ascribes to
kinship theorists.
The first of these axioms elaborates on Schneider’s iden-
tification of kinship—alongside economics, politics, and
religion—as “one of the four privileged institutions, do-
mains, or rubrics of social science, each of which is con-
ceived to be a natural, universal, vital component of society”
(1984:187). With this having been the topic of the preced-
ing, short chapter, Schneider moves directly to state the
second axiom, which claims that
kinship has to do with the reproduction of human beings and
the relations between human beings that are the concomitants of
reproduction. The reproduction of human beings is formulated as
a sexual and biological process. Sexual relations are an integral part
of kinship, though sexual relations may have significance outside
kinship and sexual relations per se are not necessarily kinship
relations. [Schneider 1984:188]
This second axiom can be stated so as to connect ex-
plicitly with and clarify the doctrine it putatively supports:
kinship has been construed primarily as a bio-essentialist re-
lationship of one kind or another, one between biological
ancestor–descendant pairs that, over time, constitute bio-
logical ancestor–descendant lineages. Sexual relations mat-
ter insofar as they are the biological means through which
these pairs and lineages are generated. In old-speak, kin-
ship is a matter of consanguinity, biologically construed,
with alliances relevant insofar as they create the resulting
bio-genealogy.9
Schneider playfully names the third axiom, which he
refers to as “the fundamental assumption” in several places
(e.g., 1984:176, 177), “Blood Is Thicker Than Water.”
Given its fundamentality, it is unfortunate (even if inevitable)
that there is no clear, univocal statement of what the axiom
says. To get a sense of the problems here, consider three
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of Schneider’s earlier references to “Blood Is Thicker Than
Water” (see also 1984:173, 176, 177, 189, 191, 193, 194):
(1) The assumption that Blood Is Thicker Than Water says that whatever
variable elements may be grafted onto kinship relations, all kinship re-
lations are essentially the same and share universal features. [1984:174]
(2) This assumption [that Blood Is Thicker Than Water] makes kinship or
genealogical relations unlike any other social bonds, for they have es-
pecially strong binding force and are directly constituted by, grounded
in, determined by, formed by, the imperatives of the biological nature
of human nature. [1984:174]
(3) Because “Blood Is Thicker Than Water,” kinship consists in bonds on
which kinsmen can depend and which are compelling and stronger
than, and take priority over, other kinds of bonds . . . All kinship
bonds are of essentially the same kind. All of this is because kinship is
a strong solidary bond that is largely innate, a quality of human nature,
biologically determined, however much social or cultural overlay may also be
present. [1984:165–166, italics in original]
Reference (1) characterizes the axiom as saying that kin-
ship has universal features. The second reference has “Blood
Is Thicker ThanWater” implying that genealogical bonds are
distinctive in strength and that they are the result of a bio-
logical imperative. Perhaps developing this latter theme, the
third reference characterizes the axiom as implying that kin-
ship bonds are constitutive of human nature or biologically
determined: they are part of our psychological or biologi-
cal makeup. Having an essence, being distinctively strong,
and being largely innate, however, are three very different
properties. (Schneider himselfmay have intended, of course,
to point to all three of these features—or might not have
noticed, or cared about, the differences between them.)
In his concluding summary, Schneider more elaborately
presents “Blood Is Thicker Than Water” as follows:
sexual reproduction creates biological links between persons and
these have important qualities apart from any social or cultural
attributes which may be attached to them [and which are] . . .
derivative of and of less determinate significance than the bio-
logical relations. These biological relations have special qualities;
they create and constitute bonds, ties, solidary relationships pro-
portional to the biological closeness of the kind . . . These are
considered to be natural ties inherent in the human condition,
distinct from the social or cultural. [1984:188]
Although Schneider’s reference to “natural ties inherent
in the human condition” may signal innateness again, the
primary pair of characterizations in this passage is of bio-
logical relations as being important or having significance in
abstraction from social or cultural attributes and of them
being determinative of other properties and relations. These
are yet further features that Schneider attributes to bio-
essentialist conceptions within kinship studies. Thus, “Blood
Is Thicker Than Water” says any or all of the following:
biologically construed kinship relations have universal fea-
tures, are distinctive in strength, are innate (part of human
nature, biologically determined), have significance in ab-
straction from any other properties or relations, and are
determinative of such other properties and relations.10
Later we will see why kinship itself does not have
any of these distinct features essentially. The issue here,
however, is the relationship of “Blood Is Thicker Than
Water” and Schneider’s other axioms to the traditional study
of kinship, kinship past. A reading of that axiom ascribing all
five features to how kinship has been conceived throughout
a tradition stretching 100 years would merely parody that
tradition, offering a kind of pastiche of different views of
kinship that adequately characterizes none of them, a point
I develop further in the next section. As Schneider’s own
detailed discussion (1984:97–143) suggests, many promi-
nent kinship theorists, such as E´mile Durkheim, W. H. R.
Rivers, and Bronisław Malinowski, reject one or more of
the above characterizations of kinship.
One might well think that, because the big idea at the
heart of Schneider’s discontent with kinship studies past that
has had much downstream influence within kinship present
remains clear, this is just so much textual wrangling: nu-
ances aside, Schneider did show that those working on kin-
ship had continually projected onto non-Western cultures
a conception of kinship according to which biological, ge-
nealogical, and reproductive relations play distinctive roles
in structuring and governing the social relations and cultural
practices subsumed under kinship. I want to suggest, how-
ever, that this big idea itself faces a series of deep problems
that derive from the kind of complexity revealed by our
hermeneutical side-trip through Schneider’s text and that
these problems continue to plague contemporary dismissals
of bio-essentialism.
PROBLEMS FOR THE BIG IDEA ABOUT
BIO-ESSENTIALISM AND KINSHIP
Consider first bio-essentialism and the study of kinship. On
the one hand, softened or weakened interpretations of each
of Schneider’s axioms and the Doctrine of Genealogical
Unity of Mankindmay well encompass all major kinship the-
orists, including Morgan, Durkheim, Rivers, Malinowski,
Evans-Prichard, Claude Le´vi-Strauss, Murdock, and Meyer
Fortes. Yet such interpretations—for example, taking the
second axiom to say simply that kinship concerns biological
reproduction and its outcomes in some way—give us doc-
trines denied by very few, including Schneider himself. On
the other hand, offering enriched or strengthened character-
izations of these axioms and theDoctrine tomake themmore
substantive—say, taking “Blood Is Thicker Than Water” to
entail the strong, five-fold form of bio-essentialism that we
outlined in the previous section—produces an analysis that
fails to apply to many prominent kinship theorists. For ex-
ample, both Durkheim and Le´vi-Strauss are well known for
giving priority to kinship as a social rather than as a bio-
logical category. Thus, interpreting Schneider’s second or
third axioms to imply that biological relations determine or
fix kinship, or that the social recognition of kinship is only
an overlay to a biological foundation for kinship, leads to a
characterization of traditional kinship studies that excludes
key figures, such as Durkheim or Le´vi-Strauss.11
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This dilemma raises a question about the empirical ade-
quacy of the constituent claim that the ethnocentric projec-
tion thesis makes about “The West”: Does bio-essentialism
in fact accurately characterize the study of kinship, say from
Morgan (1871) to Fortes (1969)? Proponents of the standard
narrative about kinship studies have typically supposed
an affirmative answer to this question, citing Schnei-
der’s critique (Carsten 2000:8, 2004:19–22; Franklin and
McKinnon 2001a:2–4). Yet attention to cultural variation in
kinship systems and concerns about the bio-essentializing of
kinship are readily found throughout traditional studies
of kinship, posing a further challenge to the standard
narrative.12
A parallel issue arises with respect to the second part
of the claim of ethnocentric projection, that concerning
“The Rest”: Are there any non-Western cultures in which
biological, genealogical, and reproductive relations play a
distinctive role in characterizing kinship? For Schneider’s
thesis goes significantly beyond denying the universality of
bio-essentialized kinship to proclaiming its absence beyond
the West—implying that no non-Western cultures share a
distinctly Western, bio-essentialized conception of kinship
(see also McKinley 2001:136). This claim would be refuted
simply by finding one such culture that ascribes biological,
genealogical, or reproductive relations the distinctive role
they have (let us suppose) in the West. On the enriched un-
derstandings of bio-essentialism we have been considering,
there may be few (if any) such cultures, but I have already
indicated that such understandings of bio-essentialism do not
characterize the views of many (if any) kinship theorists. By
contrast, the softened versions of bio-essentialism that do
accurately capture much pre-Schneiderian anthropological
thinking about kinship also characterize many (but not all)
non-Western cultures.
In the standard narrative, recall, the study of kinship did
not dissolve after Schneider but was self-consciously trans-
formed, invoking a more pluralistic conception of kinship
as “relatedness” (see also Wilson 2016). Kinship so con-
ceived could be studied both in Western domestic places
and spaces as well as cross-culturally (e.g., Carsten 2000;
Faubion 1996), once the bio-essentialism of the past was
given up.
One problem with this view is that, as impressive as
is the variety in the conception of what makes for relatives
and relatedness, there must be some way to delineate the
particular forms of “being related to” that pick out kinship
from the larger genus of human relationships. That genus in-
cludes relationships of intimacy, such as friendship and love,
of enmity, and even more mundane relationships, such as
being a neighbor of or belonging to the same Internet chat
group. We gain a universally applicable notion of kinship as
relatedness only by failing to distinguish kinship from many
things it is not. Here the price of the radical pluralism em-
braced by the conception of kinship as simply relatedness
is not so much eternal vigilance as ubiquitous and bound-
less kinship. To come full circle, if we appeal to biological,
genealogical, and reproductive relations to rein in the con-
cept of kinship—that is, if we treat it bio-essentially—as is
implicit in the practice (if not the theory) of the new kinship
studies, we are not so very far from the object of Schneider’s
critique.13
So probing at the very idea of bio-essentialismvia Schnei-
der’s own discussion reinforces doubts about the standard
narrative of the history of kinship studies and the place of bio-
essentialism in that history. Bio-essentialism about kinship
holds that biology, genealogy, and reproduction are distinc-
tive features of kinship.We have seen that the distinctiveness
of such features was construed in various ways by Schneider
himself and that the resulting gradient running from soft-
ened to enriched forms of bio-essentialism poses problems
for critiques of bio-essentialism insensitive to this variation.
But that variation also creates an opening for a positive view
of kinship or relatedness that allows one to reconsider bio-
essentialism afresh.Here I drawon recentwork in the history
and philosophy of science that has engaged with essential-
ism in a sustained manner over the past 25 years that views
biological, genealogical, and reproductive relations as con-
straints on, but not determinants of, the concept of kinship.14
HOMEOSTATIC PROPERTY CLUSTER KINDS,
KINSHIP, AND BIO-ESSENTIALISM
On what is sometimes called a traditional essentialist view
(Wilson 1999), kinds are defined by a set of underlying,
essential properties, each individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for membership in the kind, where such prop-
erties also are causes of the kind’s observable properties.
Kinds in the physical sciences are often thought to have
such essences. The chemical kind water is defined in terms
of its being composed of two bonded molecules of hydro-
gen and one molecule of oxygen, and the associated mi-
crostructural properties of water are causally responsible
for its higher-level, observable properties, such as its trans-
parency and boiling point. Likewise, a proton in physics is
a particle with a positive charge and a particular mass, and
these properties are the causes for a proton’s observable
properties, such as its behavior in gravitational and electro-
static fields.
The most natural way to apply this form of essentialism
to bio-essentialist conceptions of kinship would be to define
kinship in terms of some set of biological, genealogical, and
reproductive relations, relations that would also serve as the
underlying causes of putatively “higher-level” social and cul-
tural features of kinship. Such an application of traditional
essentialism to kinship would specify a precise form of bio-
essentialism about kinship of the kind that Schneider sought
to critique, one according to which biological, genealog-
ical, and reproductive relations played an asymmetrically
determinative role in the universal structure of kinship.
Whatever one says about physical and chemical kinds,
there are compelling, well established, general reasons to
reject traditional essentialism about both biological and so-
cial natural kinds (Hull 1965a, 1965b; Sober 1980). Many
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biological kinds, such as species, subsume an intrinsic hetero-
geneity (Wilson 2005: chs. 4–5) among their members, de-
feating attempts to define them in terms of intrinsic essences.
For example, interbreeding between individuals within a
species promotes genetic variation within that species, im-
plying that there is no genetic essence for species member-
ship. The same is true of social kinds: there is no intrinsic
property shared by those who are unemployed or criminals.
The cultural variation central to the Schneiderian re-
jection of bio-essentialism about kinship provides reason to
see kinship or relatedness as likewise intrinsically hetero-
geneous and so to reject such traditional essentialism about
kinship in particular. This failure of traditional essentialism
implies that biological, genealogical, and reproductive prop-
erties and relations cannot be distinctive features of kinship
in virtue of being some kind of underlying, determinative
essence of kinship. That distinctiveness, if it exists, must
be understood in some other way. It is better understood,
I suggest, in terms of imposing constraints on the concept of
kinship. Consider an analogy to the concept of disease.
Even though the causes and effects of diseases can be
conceived differently, as can their prevention, cure, and
social significance, there is still something distinctive of
disease—namely, that it concerns the health and well-being
of some living thing and, thus, the proper functioning of
that thing’s body or mind. We can express this relation-
ship by viewing health and well-being as constraints on the
concept of disease. Biology, genealogy, and reproduction
constrain the concept of kinship in much the way that health
and well-being constrain the concept of disease. To say this
about kinship is nontrivial, insofar as many key notions in
anthropology—for example, the other “privileged institu-
tions” of economic, politics, and religion—are not con-
strained in this way. This constraints-based view suggests
the form that bio-essentialism might take, given the falsity
of traditional essentialism.
Within recent philosophy of science, the most widely
discussed alternative to traditional essentialism about bio-
logical kinds provides the resources for articulating such a
constraining relationship. This is the homeostatic property
cluster (HPC) view of kinds, developed originally for moral
properties and later applied to species and other biological
kinds that are intrinsically heterogeneous. Despite its un-
wieldy name, the idea behind this view is relatively simple.
At least many (if not all) kinds are defined by stable clusters
of properties, only some subset of which is necessary for
membership in the kind and the stability of which is un-
derwritten by facts about the world, including underlying
mechanisms of co-occurrence.15
This appeal to worldly stability distinguishes the HPC
view as a form of naturalistic realism from similar-sounding
approaches, such as pheneticism or numerical taxonomy
about species and higher-order taxa in evolutionary biology,
and from Needham’s earlier “polythetic” view of kinship,
based in his appeals to Wittgenstein’s notion of family re-
semblance. In contrast to the HPC view, these views are
forms of operationalism or instrumentalism about kinds. As
with other applications of the HPC view (e.g., to species),
a HPC approach to kinship at least purports to provide the
basis for a sophisticated form of realism about kinship.16
On the HPC view of kinship, biological relations, such
as gives birth to, is born from the same body as, and procreates with,
partially and nonessentially characterize kinship, alongside
other kinds of relations, such as is primarily cared for by, lives
in the same house as, and enters into a socially recognized ceremony
of marriage with. Just which biological and social relations
constitute kinship in any specific cultural circumstance is
revealed by corresponding ethnographic work, and relations
that are constitutive in some such circumstances need not
even be present in others. Within a culture, or a culture at
a time or a subculture, these constitutive relations form a
cluster that is stabilized by mechanisms and systems, making
the clustering systematic rather than a matter of mere social
construction or a theorist’s projective imposition.
Such mechanisms in the case of kinship often take the
form of established practices and conventions, with variation
in these producing the variation we find in kinship systems.
For example, consider just the pair-wise clustering of the
biological relation being born from the same body as and the social
relation lives in the same house as. This pairing is supported
by the widespread (but not universal) cross-cultural practice
of siblings living together with their biological parents. The
laws, customs, and moral codes that serve as mechanisms
reinforcing the stability of this clustering allow for this pair of
relations to come apart—parents can die or be incapacitated,
foster care and guardianships exist, other family members
may provide the house for one or another of two siblings, and
children do (eventually, I’m told) leave home. Moreover,
cultures exist in which this pair-wise clustering is diminished
or absent altogether, having instead a conception of kinship
or relatedness that draws on other homeostatic clusterings
of properties in the HPC kind (cf. Carsten 2004 on houses
and kinship).
Particular HPC proposals regarding kinship will be
informed by empirical, often ethnographic work, and the
HPC view itself could be falsified by the results of that
work. The view would turn out to be false if the relevant
biological and social relations did not cluster at all; if
kinship were documented in the total absence of some such
cluster of relations; if what clustering there was lacked
the systematicity and stability crucial on the HPC view;
or if there were completely nonoverlapping clusters of
relations across different cultural circumstances—a sort of
splintering of the concept of kinship. This falsifiability is
part of what makes the HPC view of kinship a substantive,
even if high-level, hypothesis about the nature of kinship.
Finally, note how the HPC view of kinship integrates
with the alternative narrative to the history of the study of
kinship introduced earlier. The change from traditional to
the new kinship studies does not so much replace a bio-
essentialist notion of kinship with a more general notion of
relatedness as draw on a shared conception of kinship that
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has come over time to emphasize new, often technologically
mediated biological and social relations as the foundation for
kinship relations in increasingly globalized world cultures.
Adjustments and augmentations of the conception of kinship
in response to shifts in Western social and cultural practices
are simply changes in the HPC kind kinship. Whether the
HPC view further supports bio-essentialism about kinship
in marking out distinctive biological, genealogical, and re-
productive relations remains an open, empirical issue. But
once we think of these relations as constraining rather than
defining kinship, we have a ready-made place for those rela-
tions in the conception of kinship in the wake of the failure
of traditional essentialism, whether or not that place accords
these relations a distinctive role in kinship.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Early in this article, I noted in passing that recent integrative
work by Sahlins and ethnographically centered articles pub-
lished in this journal by Elise Berman (2014) and Siobha´n
Mattison and colleagues (2014) have at best an ambivalent
relationship to the new kinship studies. Returning to discuss
this work in concluding should both clarify the nature of
the contribution that the HPC view makes to kinship studies
and round out the overall reconsideration of bio-essentialism
about kinship that is my chief aim here.
Sahlins’s (2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b) wide-ranging,
deep-reaching, yet succinct discussion of kinship has already
garnered much attention within anthropology, and it is par-
ticularly apt here to continue the comparisons to Schneider’s
work invoked in many initial responses to Sahlins. Sahlins’s
own three-word summary of his view of what kinship is—
“mutuality of being”—seeks to express the overall integrity
of kinship studies, departing from Schneider’s iconoclastic
labeling of kinship as “a non-subject.” Still, Sahlins shares
with Schneider a view of kinship as culture, rather than bi-
ology, with this bifurcation between these two understand-
ings of kinship—what kinship is, is culture; what it is not,
is biology—literally structuring Sahlins’s book. Rejecting
such a division is central to the constraints-based, HPC view
of kinship, which constructively enables a move beyond the
culture–biology divide.
In addition, while “mutuality of being” provides a short
and informative anchoring definition of kinship, the HPC
view of kinship takes the very enterprise of providing such a
definition to be a relic of a game that philosophers have long
played—the search for necessary and sufficient conditions
for concepts—a game that has never been won. The sweep
of Sahlins’s (2013a:2) “exercise in uncontrolled comparison
. . . with ethnographic examples cherry-picked from among
this people and that” in support of the idea that kinship is
mutuality of being makes for engaged and engaging read-
ing. But the function of such examples is quite different
in the HPC view. They are not illustrative of a view that
we accept prior to their consideration. Rather, the details
provided by ethnographic work allow for a specification of
the properties that make for kinship “among this people
and that” and that provide evidence about the homeostatic
mechanisms that make those properties both hang together
yet vary across different cultural circumstances. Integrating
such details into the framework provided by the HPC view
is critical, of course, to the full development of that view’s
application to kinship. But it is a downstream job for ethno-
graphers themselves reconsidering bio-essentialism beyond
the bifurcated, reductive, either–or take on culture and bi-
ology that Sahlins and Schneider share.
Berman’s (2014) “interactional constraints” on kinship
practices associated with the experience of adoption in the
Marshall Islands, constraints imposed by the physicality and
materiality of pregnancy and childbirth, and Mattison and
colleagues’ (2014) reevaluation of the view that the Mosuo
“do not have fathers” can both be read in this light. Both
articles are concerned with what might be thought of as ex-
cessive responses to perceived bio-essentialism, responses
that either mistakenly deny or minimize the place of bi-
ological constraints on kinship (cf. also Wilson 2009). In
effect, each article reconsiders bio-essentialism in a way that
moves beyond the bifurcated view of culture and biology un-
derpinning the false dilemma between socially constructed
and biologically reductive views of kinship, a dilemma
present even in sophisticated, integrative theoreticalworkon
kinship.
Around the time that Schneider began his critique of
reductive, bio-essentialist views of kinship, Clifford Geertz
(1973:37) also caricatured what he called the “stratigraphic
conception” of various dimensions to culture, according to
which biological factors provided the foundational level for
an analysis of higher-level factors, such as the psychological
and social. The rejection of such a stratigraphic conception
is the rejection of one kind of bio-essentialism about social
relations and culture, one implicit in the Parsonian demar-
cation of culture as the anthropological realm that shaped
and informed the views of both Geertz and Schneider.
Schneider’s views constitute themost influential critique
not only of this kind of reductive bio-essentialism about
kinship in particular but also of a much more loosely defined
bio-essentialism about kinship. Although I have suggested
that the murkiness in what bio-essentialism amounts to in
Schneider’s critique of kinship raises questions about the
rejection of bio-essentialism and the delineation of kinship
within the new kinship studies, Schneider’s idea that biology
and kinship themselves are culturally constituted has had a
deservedly strong influence on the direction of the study
of kinship. Perhaps ironically, bio-essentialism itself may
encompass a broad enough rubric to show how kinship is
something more than Schneider’s epigraphic “non-subject.”
Elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences, forms
of essentialism divorced from the kind of reductionism that
both Geertz and Schneider rightly rejected have for some
years garnered serious consideration for the constructive
promissory notes they issue. In kinship studies, those promis-
sory notes include a nonreductive conception of kinship, the
HPC view of kinship, that accords a proper place for both
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biological and social relations. I have argued here that re-
considering bio-essentialism about kinship invites a richer
understanding of the relationship between kinship past and
kinship present, and I have outlined why the HPC view of
kinship creates an appropriately nonfoundational space for
biological, reproductive, and genealogical relations in the
conception of kinship. Whether those promissory notes ful-
fill their potential is something very much for the kinship
future to determine, both that influenced by Schneider and
that showing more continuity with kinship past.
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1. Apart from the important works of Carsten, Kuper, and Peletz
already cited, versions of this narrative can be found in Bamford
and Leach 2009a, Barnes 2006, Brightman 2013, Dousset 2007,
Faubion 1996, Franklin 2013, Franklin and McKinnon 2001a,
Levine 2008, Trautmann 2001, and Yanagisako and Collier
1987.
2. Informative characterizations of both Schneider’s critique and
the new direction in kinship studies can be found in novel, in-
tegrative research on kinship (Carsten 2000; Faubion 2001;
Viveiros de Castro 2009); in area reviews (Levine 2008;
Peletz 1995, 2001; Scheffler 2001); in explicit reflections
on Schneider’s influence (Feinberg 1979, 2001; Feinberg and
Ottenheimer 2001; Kuper 1999: ch.4; Wallace 1969); in self-
conscious locational work from researchers at the forefront of
the redirection of the study of kinship (Bamford and Leach
2009a; Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Franklin and McKinnon
2001a); in critiques of ethnographic research conducted in the
new kinship studies (Shapiro 2009, 2010, 2011); and in critical
discussions of books in the field (Barnes 2006; Dousset 2007;
Faubion 1996; Goody 2005; Miller 2007; Shapiro 2015b).
3. I shall return to discuss this recent work further in conclud-
ing. Note also that Schneider’s critique features prominently in
the background discussions in most of the contributions to the
2013 Hau book symposium dedicated to Sahlins 2013a; see, for
example, Brightman 2013 and Shryock 2013.
4. The HPC view originates in the ongoing rethinking of essen-
tialism beyond anthropology in philosophical work on ethics
(Boyd 1988), the emotions (Griffiths 1997), species (Boyd 1999;
Griffiths 1999; Wilson 1999), biological kinds more generally
(Wilson 2005; Wilson et al. 2007), and human kinds (Khalidi
2013).
5. For a representative, diverse sampling, see Bamford and Leach
2009b; Carsten 2004; Eng 2010; Faubion 2001; Franklin 2013,
2014; Franklin and McKinnon 2001b; Levine 2008; Rapp and
Ginsburg 2001; Strathern 2005; Toren 2015; andWeston 1997.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of such work, much ongoing
work on kinship bypassed Schneider’s critique and continues
with more affinity to kinship past; see, for example, Allen et al.
2008; Dziebel 2007; Godelier et al. 1998; McConvell et al.
2013; Read 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Shapiro 2009, 2015a, 2015b;
and Wilson 2009.
6. Although this appeal to a translation manual might be thought of
as a metaphor for an unwritten practice, works that functioned
as an actual manual began with the publication of W. H. R.
Rivers’s (1968[1910]) “The Genealogical Method of Anthropo-
logical Inquiry.” Such appeals to genealogy played crucial roles
in eugenics around the same time, largely through the work
of the Eugenics Records Office at Cold Spring Harbor and in
earlier appeals to tree-structures in taxonomic thinking. See
http://eugenicsarchive.ca on eugenics, Bouquet 1996 on tree
thinking, and Bamford and Leach (2009a, 2009b) on genealogy
more generally.
7. AsWittgenstein (1953) had argued, there is no essence to being
a game, no single feature or set of features that all games share
in virtue of which they are games. Rather, each game shares
some features with some other game, much as each member of
a family may resemble some other member of that family (see
also Biletzki and Matar 2014).
8. In American Kinship: A Cultural Account (1980[1968]), Schneider
did not provide quantitative ethnographic data to support his
claims, simply informing readers, in his preface, that his analysis
rested on 6,000 pages of interviews. Nor did he engage in
ethnographic speculation about kinship elsewhere, beyond the
statement that kinship in “primitive and peasant societies” was
less “differentiated” (1980[1968]:vii). For important critiques of
Schneider’s analysis ofU.S. kinship, seeFeinberg1979,Fogelson
2001, Kuper 1999:134–143, Wallace 1969, and Yanagisako
1985.
9. I avoid paraphrasing simply in terms of genealogy here for two
reasons. First, following Goodenough 2001, I take genealogy
to have a much more encompassing sense in kinship studies
than it is portrayed as having by Schneider and those accepting
his critique. Second, there remain nonbiological approaches to
genealogical kinship relations, such as Read (2001a, 2007), dis-
tinguishing between “genealogical grid” and “genealogical tree,”
and Montague 2001, which views kinship as offering a multiple-
slotting classification. For the role of genealogy in structuring
how social scientists, particularly anthropologists, have concep-
tualized the lives of non-Western people, see Bamford and Leach
2009b.
10. While the aphorism “blood is thicker than water” is sometimes
used descriptively to summarize, explain, or even predict inter-
personal interactions, its more significant use is as a prescriptive
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or normative reminder to a particular relative to emphasize the
importance of his or her biological family obligations and expec-
tations based on these familial ties. Schneider’s neglect of the
normative or prescriptive meaning of the aphorism itself may
seem puzzling, but it reflects his general segregation of norms
and values from culture (e.g., Schneider 1976:202–203) as part
of his distinctive departure from the Parsonian paradigm from
which his views developed. See also Kuper (1999:71 and ch. 4)
and Fogelson (2001:33–35) for broader discussion of Schneider
here.
11. Schneider (1984:191) responds to this kind of objection, saying,
for example, that when “Durkheim said that ‘kinship is social or
it is nothing’, he did not mean that it loses its roots in biology
and human reproduction; only that it was now to be treated as
a social fact, not a biological fact.” This view of Durkheim is
unconvincing in part for reasons Schneider himself gives in ear-
lier discussion (1984:99–101); see also Sahlins (2013a:12–18)
on Schneider on Durkheim. Schneider’s handling of Durkheim
here is especially egregious but still representative of his lim-
itations as a historian of his own discipline. For his treatment
of Rivers, see Schneider (1984:102–107), and see Goodenough
(2001:207–211) on Rivers and more generally on genealogy in
kinship studies.
12. This is to raise a prima facie problemwith the empirical adequacy
of Schneider’s claims about kinship past,worth articulating given
the largely uncriticalway inwhich those claims have been treated
within the new kinship studies. Arguing definitively against the
empirical adequacy of Schneider’s analysis of kinship studies,
however, would require a distinct, chiefly historical research
article. Schneider’s skepticism about his earlier ethnography of
Yap grew from doubts sown by his selective reading of Labby’s
(1976) Marxist ethnography of Yap and occupies the first half
of A Critique of the Study of Kinship. My skepticism about Schnei-
der’s analysis of kinship studies grows from doubts sown by
his selective reading of those studies, which occupies Critique’s
second half. See also Kuper (1999:147–149) and Goodenough
2001.
13. Precisely the same concern has been expressed about Sahlins’s
(2013a) view of kinship as mutuality of being, including in
the contributions by Bloch 2013, Brightman 2013, Feuchtwang
2013, and Shryock 2013 to the Hau book symposium; cf. the
contrasting view on this delineation problem of Carsten 2013 as
well as Sahlins’s (2013b) reply to symposiasts.
14. Apart from this work’s growing prominence in the philosophy
of science (see below), I simply note the broader engagement
with essentialism to which it contributes, including questioning
the adequacy of what historians of biology call “the essential-
ism story” in their field (Amundson 2005; Winsor 2006); the
resurrection of essentialism about species in the philosophy of
biology (Devitt 2008); and the articulation of psychological es-
sentialism in cognitive science and its putative implications for
anthropology (Gil-White 2001).
15. See Boyd 1988 for the original HPC view; Boyd 1999, Griffiths
1999, andWilson 1999 for the original deployments to species;
Griffiths 1997, Kornblith 1993, Rieppel 2005, Slater 2013,
Wilson 2005, and Wilson et al. 2007 for extensions to other
kinds; andEreshefsky andMatthen2005,Ereshefsky andReydon
2015,Magnus 2014, and Slater (2012, 2014) for ongoing critical
discussions.
16. For pheneticism and numerical taxonomy, see Sokal and Sneath
1963; for earlier, so-called polythetic definitions of kinship, see
Barnard and Good 1984, Good 1996, and Needham (1971,
1975). The link between the HPC view and realism is clear
throughout the literature cited in the preceding endnote, but
see especially Boyd (1988, 1999), Griffiths 1999, Kornblith
1993, and Wilson 1999.
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